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The Belgian social security systems face an uncertain future. One major
reason is the ﬁnancial burden imposed by the aging of the population. For
the systems to survive this demographic process, higher contribution lev-
els, lower beneﬁts, or both will have to be introduced, given the pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) nature of these systems. Indeed, a straight increase in the public
debt to ﬁnance this demographic transition is not an option as it would
mean pushing the already high ratio of public debt to gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) to even further astronomical heights. Most recently however,
the successive Belgian governments have successfully brought down the
debt-GDP ratio to close to 115 percent from a level of 130 percent by
means of strict budgetary policy. The government has even achieved a
small budget surplus in 2001 and has reached the same goal in 2002 even in
the presence of an economic slowdown. This ﬁscal rigor will no doubt in-
crease the margin of maneuverability of the federal government in its at-
tempts to cope with the demographic aging process.
Another factor of uncertainty pertains to the consequences of increased
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(FRFC Project no. 2.4.544.01).of all, increased mobility between jobs in the public sector, in the private
sector, and in self-employment may induce large changes in the way the
three corresponding social security systems work. Recent reform propos-
als by the Belgian federal government to improve the way the public sector
works also has to be seen in this light. Mobility between sectors will most
likely increase once people’s behavior is determined by similar factors
measuring achievement and productivity in both the public and the private
sectors. In those circumstances, a review and harmonization of the corre-
sponding public retirement-income systems seems warranted. Second, the
question of international job mobility is becoming more and more impor-
tant, particularly for a small open economy in the heart of Europe like Bel-
gium. Jousten and Pestieau (2002) study the implications of an expected
increase in labor mobility from a European perspective, and the authors
pay particular attention to the degree of redistribution inherent to the
diﬀerent systems. They argue that both levels of intra- and intergenera-
tional redistribution will be widely aﬀected, even if we replace the assump-
tion of perfect labor mobility between member countries with a more re-
strictive and plausible one of mobility limited to individuals belonging to
particular income groups.
However, even leaving these two challenges aside, the Belgian social
security system needs reform. The widespread use of a variety of early re-
tirement programs makes Belgium the country with the lowest average re-
tirement age in the Western world, which is approximately ﬁfty-seven years
old for men.1This chapter studies the incentives pushing people toward re-
tiring early. We explicitly model the incentive structure built into the vari-
ous public retirement and early retirement systems. First, we compute in-
dicators of beneﬁt entitlement, such as social security wealth. Then, we
deﬁne several diﬀerent incentive measures based on the notion of social se-
curity wealth. In a third step, we perform an empirical estimation of micro-
econometric probit and option value models. From our exceptionally rich
and broad database, we are able to compute a rather accurate measure of
all individuals’ pension wealth, as well as of the implicit tax rates the el-
derly workers face in case of delayed retirement.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 describes the essen-
tial features of the various public retirement and early retirement systems.
In section 1.3, we explain the diﬀerent, mostly administrative components
of our large data set. The following section touches on the problem of the
earnings process used in the simulations and estimations. Section 1.5 ex-
plains the process and logic underlying the construction of the diﬀerent
incentive measures used, while section 1.6 contains regression results ob-
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1. The average retirement age of 57.6 years for men was estimated by Blöndal and Scarpetta
(1998) on the basis of the Labor Force Surveys. In this study we estimated an average retire-
ment age of 58.4 years for men and 57.4 years for women.tained using these latter incentive measures. Section 1.7 delivers two policy
simulations using the previously estimated coeﬃcients. The ﬁrst simula-
tion consists of an increase by three years of the eligibility age in the vari-
ous retirement systems, and the second consists of a policy in which early
retirement would be possible at age sixty at the earliest, while normal re-
tirement age would be sixty-ﬁve. Section 1.8 is devoted to the conclusions.
1.2 Social Security Schemes
The Belgian retirement income system rests upon three very unequal
pillars. First of all, there are the public social security programs that rep-
resent the largest part of pension income for a wide majority in the pop-
ulation. The second pillar consists of company pension schemes, which
only play a minor role as a source of income for the average Belgian
worker. Essentially, they are currently conﬁned to the higher-income indi-
viduals in the private sector and to the self-employed, a ﬁnding that is at
least in part due to their tax treatment. A third type of retirement income
comes from individual retirement savings. These take multiple forms:
there are tax-favored individual-pension savings accounts with a maxi-
mum annual contribution of €580 per person (approximately U.S.$615),2
or there are more traditional savings vehicles, such as the tax-favored sav-
ings accounts, investments in trust funds, life insurance, and so forth. The
dominance of the ﬁrst pillar can also be represented in numbers: Whereas
the ﬁrst pillar represents pension entitlements of more than 250 percent
of GDP, assets in private-pension funds only amount to 10 percent of
GDP.3
The ﬁrst pillar, public retirement programs, essentially consists of four
components. There are three large sectoral social security programs; one
for the public sector, one for the private-sector wage earners, and one for
the self-employed. Some special categories of workers, such as coalmine
workers and military personnel, have special retirement systems that we
will not analyze in the present paper. A fourth large category of public re-
tirement income consists of the guaranteed-minimum-pension system that
operates on a means-tested basis.
Aside from these pure retirement programs, the Belgian government has
introduced early retirement provisions that either operate under the name
of early retirement scheme, or alternatively as a form of old age unem-
ployment. Table 1.1 gives a brief outline of the importance of the diﬀerent
categories of social security programs for the year 1995.
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2. In this paper, we apply an exchange rate of €0.942 per $1, which approximately corre-
sponds to the exchange rate in place on 31 December 1999.
3. See the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD; 1994),
Bouillot and Perelman (1995), and the European Economic Community (EEC; 1994) on the
subject.1.2.1 Wage Earners’ Scheme
The wage earners’ scheme is the largest program, according to the num-
ber of people aﬃliated with the program. The program allows for retire-
ment between the ages of sixty and sixty-ﬁve, with the choice of the retire-
ment age not inducing any actuarial adjustment.4 The system worked
according to a diﬀerent logic till the early 1990s. Until 1992, the wage earn-
ers’ scheme had an actuarial adjustment factor of 5 percent per year of
early retirement before the age of sixty-ﬁve.
However, in the case of most workers, the choice of the retirement age is
not completely neutral with respect to the beneﬁt amount, as most men
still accrue extra pension rights by working additional years between the
ages of sixty and sixty-ﬁve. This is so because a full earnings history con-
sists of forty-ﬁve years of work for men, a condition that many people do
not satisfy at the age of sixty. For those having more than forty-ﬁve work-
ing years, a dropout-year provision replaces low-income years with higher
ones. The situation so far has been slightly diﬀerent for women. Indeed,
until very recently, women only needed forty years of earnings to have a
complete earnings history. In reaction to successive court rulings on the il-
legality of this sex discrimination, the Belgian government introduced a re-
form a few years ago that aims at progressively increasing the complete ca-
reer condition to forty-ﬁve working years for women over the time period
1997–2009. However, for most women included in our data set, a full career
still consists of forty years of work.
Beneﬁts are computed based on earnings during periods of aﬃliation.
The beneﬁt formula can be represented as follows:
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Table 1.1 Categories of Social Security Schemes in 1995
Beneﬁts Number Average Amount
as % of of of Beneﬁts in
GDP Pensionersa Relative Terms (%)
Wage earners 5.72 1,347 87.3
Self-employed 0.71 246 59.1
Public-sector workers 3.38 405 170.7
Mandatory early retirement 0.64 128 103.8
Minimum old age pensioners 0.14 50 56.7
All schemes 10.59 2,175 100.0
Source: Bouillot and Perelman (1995).
aThe number of pensioners is reported in thousands and also includes surviving spouses. A
possibility of double counting exists.
4. Notice that, from a legal point of view, age sixty-ﬁve does not represent a compulsory re-
tirement age, but rather an age at which a worker loses the social protection associated with
his job.Beneﬁt    
N
n
    average wage   k,
where n represents the number of years of aﬃliation with the wage earner’s
scheme, N the number of years required for a full career (in our case either
forty or forty-ﬁve), and k is a replacement rate, which takes on the value of
0.60 or 0.75 depending on whether the social security recipient claims ben-
eﬁts as a single person or as a household. The variable average wage cor-
responds to indexed average wages over the period of aﬃliation, with in-
dexation on the price index combined with additional discretionary
adjustments for the evolution of growth. A peculiar feature of the Belgian
wage earners’ scheme is that periods of the life spent on replacement in-
come (e.g., unemployment beneﬁts, disability beneﬁts, workers compensa-
tion, and the like) fully count as years worked in the computation of the av-
erage wage, and hence of the social security beneﬁt. For any such periods,
ﬁctive wages are inserted into the average wage computation. In line with
the general philosophy of the Belgian social insurance system that any such
spell on a replacement-income system is purely involuntary, imputed
wages are set equal in real terms to those that the workers earned before en-
tering these replacement-income programs.
An additional category of linked beneﬁts is payable to surviving spouses
or, more generally, to surviving dependents of deceased wage earners. All
the diﬀerent types of beneﬁts provided for under the wage earners’ social
security system are covered against erosion by the means of inﬂation
through an automatic consumer price index (CPI) adjustment.
The system works both with ﬂoors and ceilings, which are either indexed
to the evolution of prices or to average wages. The minimum household
pension represents a ﬂoor for workers that have contributed during their
entire working life to the systems. It is approximately equal to 56 percent
of average net wages. At the opposite extreme, a ceiling operates on pen-
sionable but not on taxable earnings. The earnings entering the above pen-
sion formula are strictly limited to a maximum of 120 percent of average
gross wages. Wage earners’ pensions are also subject to an earnings test.
Currently, the earnings limit is approximately €7,450, or $7,900, per year.
For earnings above this limit, pension entitlement is suspended.
The wage earners’ system is essentially based on the PAYG principle and
ﬁnanced through payroll taxes that are levied both on the side of the em-
ployers and of the employees with a combined contribution rate of 16.36
percent. The system also receives a subsidy from the Belgian federal gov-
ernment that is approximately equal to 11 percent of overall beneﬁts.
Next to the oﬃcial wage earners’ scheme, several forms of early retire-
ment programs have developed over the last few years, some oﬃcially
carrying that name and others that do not (e.g., unemployment, preretire-
ment, and so forth). Those schemes can be broadly subdivided into two
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During the 1980s and the 1990s, an arsenal of mandatory early retirement
schemes was put in place. All of these arrangements were and are based on
collective agreements, which are negotiated with the active involvement of
employees and employers, sometimes at the sectoral level or sometimes at
the level of an individual company or production site. For some companies
in a diﬃcult economic position, mandatory retirement ages as low as ﬁfty
were introduced. The federal government did not necessarily object to such
arrangements, as it considered early retirement as a good tool in the ﬁght
against youth unemployment. Indeed, some of these early retirement
schemes required the employers to rehire young workers. Lately however,
these early retirement schemes have undergone some scrutiny. Not sur-
prisingly, the beneﬁcial labor market eﬀects have been rather modest, if not
completely absent. Recent discussions and decisions at the government
level clearly move in the direction of lifting the eﬀective early retirement
age and hence also the sector-speciﬁc mandatory retirement ages.
This has to be seen in contrast to the massive costs these programs in-
duce for the federal budget, as well as for the society as a whole. First of all,
the eﬀect of these waves of early retirement on the federal budget operates
both through missing contributions during the period spanning from early
retirement to the normal retirement age as well as through additional costs.
Thus, the federal government pays a large fraction of early retirement com-
pensation.5 On the other hand, an individual’s pension rights in the wage
earners’ pension schemes are essentially unaﬀected by the decision to re-
tire early or not. This is due to the previously discussed feature of the Bel-
gian social security system that days spent on replacement income count
as working periods in the computation of average pensionable earnings
and of periods of activity. Hence, retiring early does not induce any loss of
income during retirement.
Individual early retirement diﬀerentiates itself from its collective counter-
part by the fact that it is based on an individual’s decision to retire from
work. The most prevalent way is to pass through the unemployment system
in which the unemployed aged ﬁfty or older are considered “aged unem-
ployed,” and thus neither subject to controls on availability to work, nor to
beneﬁt cuts due to long-term unemployment. Therefore, people unwilling to
continue to work can ask their employer to lay them oﬀ. The latter has no in-
centive not to lay the worker oﬀ, unless the employer considers the employee
to be a crucial wheel in the working of the company. Laying the worker oﬀ
allows the employer to replace an expensive old worker by a cheaper young
one. Furthermore, the employer’s behavior does not add any costs to his
unemployment contributions, as the system is not experience rated.
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5. Depending on the early retirement scheme, the employer pays part of the income to the
worker from the early to the normal retirement age.Next to the unemployment path, some people also attempt to proceed to
retirement through the disability-insurance scheme. However, in the Bel-
gian context, we think that disability is not a very prominent means of de-
parture, at least not for private-sector employees. Incentives to claim dis-
ability beneﬁts are rather limited: Medical screening is relatively severe,
and beneﬁts are not signiﬁcantly more interesting than early retirement
provisions.
1.2.2 Public-Sector Employees
The social security scheme for public servants is the oldest one of the
three, dating back to as early as 1844. Public pensions are paid out of the
general federal budget. Oﬃcially, the public sector pensions are considered
as deferred income rather than old age insurance. The only oﬃcial insur-
ance aspects are the 7.5 percent payroll taxes that the public-sector em-
ployees have to pay to ﬁnance survivor beneﬁts. Beneﬁts are essentially in-
dividualized, that is, there are no additional spousal beneﬁts available for
no- or low-income spouses.
Civil servants’ pensions are compulsory as of age sixty-ﬁve for both men
and women. However, as for the private sector, there is a multitude of ways
of retiring earlier than this normal age of sixty-ﬁve. It is possible to opt for
an incomplete career and retire at sixty. For some particular categories of
workers, the normal retirement age is lower than sixty-ﬁve, and early re-
tirement provisions are sometimes extremely generous. This is particularly
the case for military personnel and for teachers, who have always enjoyed
a much more favorable treatment. For example, secondary-school teachers
in the French-speaking community can either retire at age ﬁfty-ﬁve if they
have suﬃcient years of service, or alternatively take a less demanding route
in terms of career requirements and retire at the age of about ﬁfty-eight.
Public-sector pensions are based on the income earned by an individual
during the last ﬁve years before retirement. Beneﬁts are computed accord-
ing to a rather complicated formula, but can never exceed 75 percent of the
average wages over the last ﬁve years. The beneﬁt formula can be repre-
sented as follows:
Beneﬁt   average wage over last ﬁve years   min (fract; 0.75),
where fract is a fraction with a numerator consisting of the number of years
the person worked in the public service, and the denominator is a beneﬁt
accrual factor. This latter beneﬁt accrual factor, also called tantième, de-
pends on the rank the person occupied in the hierarchy. This denominator
ranges from 30 to 60, taking the value of 30 for the highest-ranking civil
servants (university professors and so forth) and 60 for the lowest ranks.
In addition to the aforementioned limit on pensions of 75 percent of the
average gross wage, there is also an absolute limit to the amount of a
public-sector pension, which corresponds to about three times average
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available to aged civil servants, which corresponds to 56 percent of average
wages for a single individual and 70 percent for a one-earner couple.6 No-
tice the rather marked diﬀerence of these ﬂoors and ceilings with those
applicable to the private-sector employees. A major conclusion we can
already draw at this stage is that higher-income civil servants get a much
better deal than their private-sector counterparts. This ﬁnding is even re-
inforced once we introduce another aspect, namely the indexation rules. As
opposed to the private-sector social security system that only indexes ben-
eﬁts to the CPI, public pensions are indexed to average wages (péréqua-
tion). Civil servants therefore enjoy the beneﬁts of productivity increases in
the economy even beyond the moment when they actively contribute to
them as workers.
Aside from this oﬃcial route to retirement, civil servants have another
alternative to quit work early through disability protection. This route
seems a much more plausible route to early retirement for public-sector
employees than for private-sector wage earners as the screening seems to
be much less severe.
1.2.3 Self-Employed
The self-employed retirement scheme is the latest one to have been in-
troduced as it has only existed since 1956. It is also the least generous of the
three big social security systems. For a very long time, pensions have been
independent of earnings levels. However, since 1984, the system has been
progressively transformed to allow for a stronger link between contribu-
tions and beneﬁts. Additional earnings past 1984 enter the pension com-
putation formula at their correct value, instead of some ﬁctive amount.
Given the period of analysis we will be looking at in our econometric anal-
ysis, pensions of the self-employed are still essentially independent of their
earnings histories and contributions.
Full beneﬁts are available at age sixty-ﬁve for men with a complete earn-
ings history of forty-ﬁve years. However, early retirement is possible as
early as age sixty with a reduction of 5 percent per year of anticipation.
Women are currently in a transitory system that progressively increases
their normal retirement age from sixty to sixty-ﬁve and the complete career
requirement from forty years of work to forty-ﬁve in line with the reform
of the wage earners’ scheme. Again, most women in our data set are still
subject to a normal retirement age of sixty and a full career condition of
forty years of work.
The social security system of the self-employed is ﬁnanced through two
broad categories of income. First, there are direct social insurance contri-
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6. The latter feature is the only instance in which the family structure matters for the
amount of civil service pension.butions levied under the form of a 16.7 percent tax on the ﬁrst €46,035
($47,368) of income and 12.27 percent on the income in the bracket be-
tween €46,035 and €67,352 ($89,302). Income above the latter threshold is
not subject to social-insurance taxation. More than 75 percent of the con-
tributions raised using this social-insurance taxation are used for the pen-
sion system of the self-employed, the remainder serves to cover health care
and other social-insurance beneﬁts for the self-employed. Second, the fed-
eral government pays a large subsidy to the system that corresponds to ap-
proximately 37 percent of beneﬁts.
Self-employed do not have access to the unemployment-insurance sys-
tem, and no other special regime has been put in place to allow them to re-
tire early. A public disability system exists, but in our opinion, it cannot be
seen as an early retirement vehicle, as it is based on criteria even more strin-
gent than those of the wage earners’ scheme. Hence, if the self-employed
desire to retire early, they generally have to transit through some private re-
tirement-income arrangement, be it a formal pension plan or simple sav-
ings.
1.2.4 Guaranteed Minimum Income
The guaranteed-minimum-income pensions are fully paid for by general
government revenue, and are means tested. This type of pension is only
available after the legal retirement age.
1.2.5 Labor Market and Beneﬁt-Program Participation
Labor market participation rates start to decline at a rather early age.
Table 1.2 illustrates the picture for men between the ages of ﬁfty and sixty-
nine. Notice the very rapid decline in the labor force participation for men
in their late ﬁfties. Part-time work plays a totally marginal role in the Bel-
gian retirement landscape. However, the Belgian government currently
plans to introduce bigger incentives for people to retire progressively
through a period of part-time work and part-time retirement. The corre-
sponding panel for women shows that early retirement schemes are much
less important for female workers than for males. The reasons for this ﬁnd-
ing are at least two. First, women sometimes do not fulﬁll some career
length requirements for access to these early retirement schemes. Second,
women tend to work in somewhat diﬀerent jobs. Many mandatory early re-
tirement schemes were set up in male-dominated vocations involving struc-
tural diﬃculties, such as heavy industry and mining.
1.2.6 Pathways to Retirement
Pathways to retirement vary somewhat according to the social security
system the worker is subject to. Table 1.3summarizes the diﬀerences for the
case of the wage earners and the self-employed. Unfortunately, we have
been unable to separate out the diﬀerent pathways for the civil servants.
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The reason for this rather disappointing fact is that our data source for the
corresponding information is the income tax returns, which do not sepa-
rate the type of pension income for public-sector employees. Focusing on
the wage earners, we see the importance of the early retirement provisions.
Furthermore, we also see the important role of the unemployment system
Table 1.2 Labor Market and Beneﬁt Program Participation (%)
50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 Total
Men
Working full time 24.71 15.39 6.64 1.59 48.33
Working part time 1.53 0.93 0.45 0.19 3.10
No beneﬁt receipt 0.73 1.10 0.74 0.03 2.60
Unemployment beneﬁts 0.63 0.62 0.52 0.01 1.78
Disability beneﬁts 0.82 1.23 1.57 0.02 3.64
Early retirement beneﬁts 0.45 3.94 6.63 1.41 12.43
Public retirement beneﬁts 0.55 1.80 7.93 17.84 28.12
Total 29.42 25.01 24.48 21.09 100.00
Women
Working full time 9.58 5.02 1.66 0.29 16.55
Working part time 3.65 1.70 0.42 0.09 5.86
No beneﬁt receipt 11.22 12.12 6.83 5.46 35.62
Unemployment beneﬁts 1.55 1.15 0.04 0.00 2.74
Disability beneﬁts 0.93 1.01 0.04 0.00 1.99
Early retirement beneﬁts 0.22 1.11 0.28 0.00 1.60
Public retirement beneﬁts 1.50 2.84 16.34 14.95 35.64
Total 28.65 24.95 25.60 20.80 100.00
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 1.3 Pathways to Retirement (%)
Wage Earners Public-Sector Employees Self-Employed
Men
Directly to SS 34.85 94.97 90.02
Early retirement then SS 46.97 5.03 0.00
Disability then SS 8.21 0.00 9.98
Unemployment then SS 9.97 0.00 0.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Women
Directly to SS 54.85 93.82 98.18
Early retirement then SS 20.02 6.18 0.00
Disability then SS 5.25 0.00 1.82
Unemployment then SS 19.88 0.00 0.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Impossible to separate the disability path for public-sector employees because of miss-
ing data.that absorbs some of the mandatory early retirees, but also some of the vol-
untary early retirees.
1.3 Data Overview
Our data set stems from ﬁve sources, which are mostly administrative
databases. We were able to match all of these using an individual national
identiﬁcation number. Our merged data set has the big advantage of being
extremely rich, as it includes data from multiple sources for a very large
fraction of the Belgian population. In the following, we brieﬂy present the
various data sources, as well as their major advantages and disadvantages.
1.3.1 Statistiques Fiscales des Revenus (SFR)
The data used for the SFR are originally collected by Finance Ministry.
The INS (National Statistical Ofﬁce) then processes the raw information
to produce the SFR. Starting in 1989, the SFR data include the national
identiﬁcation number, thereby making 1989 the ﬁrst year for which we can
merge the diﬀerent data sets needed. In our analysis, we focus on the years
ranging from 1989 to 1996. The INS records all information relevant for
the computation of individual’s tax liabilities. Variables available include
wage income and income from other professional activities, household size
and type, number of dependents in the household, age and income of
spouse and any other dependent, social-insurance transfers and private-
pension receipt, house ownership status (owner or renter), taxable real es-
tate income, contributions to second and third pillar pensions, and so forth.
1.3.2 Comptes Individuels de Pension (CIP)
The CIP is collected by the wage earners’ pension administration (ONP)
since the mid-1950s. It includes all career information relevant for the wage
earners’ pension computation: gross wages, days of work, days on social
insurance programs, and the like.
1.3.3 Institut National d’Assurance Sociale des
Travailleurs Indépendants (INASTI)
The INASTI dataset includes good information on periods of aﬃliation
as a self-employed worker. There is however no information on earnings
levels, other than those available for last years from the SFR dataset. As a
result, we decided to apply the ﬁctive earnings amounts that are used by the
social security administration in the beneﬁt computation for a large part of
the self-employed.
1.3.4 Finance Ministry, Department of Pensions
This segment of our database contains the information on the periods of
aﬃliation as a civil servant, as well as some information on wages during
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to complete the wage data using the SFR ﬁle for the period 1989–1996.
1.3.5 The 1991 Census
We only use a very limited amount of information available in the cen-
sus. Essentially, we focus on education levels that are classiﬁed according
to nine categories. Doing so, we are able to match education-speciﬁc life
tables to all the individuals in the database. Furthermore, we use industry
indicators from the census that give information on the activity sector to
which each individual belongs.
The major disadvantages of our merged data set are the slightly incom-
plete earnings information for the self-employed and public servants, as
well as the sparse information on occupational and individual private-
pension arrangements.
In our analysis, we analyze men and women separately. Our sample se-
lection procedure operates in four steps departing from the original SFR
ﬁle. First, we select households with at least one member in the ﬁfty to
sixty-four age range. Then, we draw a 2.5 percent random sample out of
this group, which gives us a total household number of 21,818. In a third
step, we match all the information from the other data sources. Finally, we
eliminate all inactive people using the following deﬁnition of retirement:
The retired are all those who have either pension or early retirement in-
come and have income from work smaller than a threshold of €7,450
($7,895), or who have unemployment or disability income and no income
from work. Table 1.4 summarizes all the relevant information for our
sample. The total number of observations, 23,238 and 9,707 for men and
women, respectively, corresponds to three successive years—1993, 1994,
and 1995—on which we focus our analysis.
1.4 Earnings Histories and Projections
Our data set contains very diﬀerent earnings information for periods of
aﬃliation with the diﬀerent systems. The CIP data allows us to reconstruct
the complete earnings histories for wage earners. For public-sector work-
ers, however, we only have wage information for the years from 1989 until
1996. Given the requirement that we need ﬁve years of earnings to compute
public-sector pension entitlements, we do a backward projection in case
there is a missing observation for one of the last ﬁve years of earnings. For
the self-employed, we have very insuﬃcient earnings information to com-
pute wage-dependent pension entitlements. Fortunately, the social secu-
rity system of the self-employed has heavily relied on ﬁctive income ﬁgures
for past years of earnings, which we use for pension computation.
As for forward projections, we decided to apply wage increases so as to
keep real wages constant (price-inﬂation adjustment) after some experi-
52 Arnaud Dellis, Raphaël Desmet, Alain Jousten, and Sergio Perelmanmentation with other wage regression models. In particular, it has the ad-
vantage of allowing for reasonable projections for people belonging to
multiple systems.
1.5 Construction of Incentive Measures
To measure the impact of the social security systems’ incentives we use
several diﬀerent indicators. A ﬁrst one is the concept of social security
wealth (SSW), which is the present discounted value of all future beneﬁt
ﬂows from a given social security system. Discounting is done allowing
both for time preference and mortality adjustments. Mortality adjust-
ments are based on education-speciﬁc life tables, as computed by De-
boosere and Gadeyne (2000) based on the 1991 Census and population
registers. Depending on the household situation and the system, SSW also
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Table 1.4 Summary Statistics
Total SD
Men Women Men Women
No. of observations 23,238 9,707
Retired (%) 8.6 9.9
Age mean 54.9 54.2 3.7 3.5
Married (%) 80.6 66.1
Inactive spouse (%) 66.4 30.7
Age diﬀerence mean 2.7 –1.9 4.0 3.9
Earnings mean 24,017 15,252 19,758 11,901
Spouse’s earnings mean 6,163 19,865 9,990 14,004
Life earnings (wage earners) 33,207 18,610 12,540 9,238
Retiring Within the
Next Year (%) Number
Men Women Men Women
Age structure
50–54 11,938 5,664 3.1 5.3
55–59 8,200 3,149 9.8 9.0
60–65 3,100 894 26.3 41.3
Social security program
Wage earner 13,135 5,242 9.6 11.0
Self-employed 3,984 1,080 5.0 7.5
Civil servant 6,119 3,385 8.6 8.8
Region
Brussels 1,850 1,330 9.1 8.7
Flanders 14,715 5,197 8.6 10.4
Wallonia 6,673 3,180 8.4 9.4
Note: Observations correspond to person-year cells. SD = standard deviation. Blank cells
indicate that data is not applicable (i.e., SD does not apply).includes an element that is a function of dependent or survivor beneﬁts.
Furthermore, SSW also has to allow for the possibility of people being sub-
ject to diﬀerent retirement-income systems. In the Belgian context, private
pensions are not integrated as they only play a minor role in the pension
landscape. However, the case of people having pension entitlements in two
or even three of the public social security programs is not rare. We apply
the oﬃcial rules that exist for cumulating beneﬁts from the three main
public systems.
We compute this SSW measure for every pathway toward retirement
that is accessible to the individual. After the construction of these SSW
–ﬁgures, we then proceed in a second step to the computation of weighted
SSW indicator, which sums the previously derived path-speciﬁc compo-
nents. We attach age-speciﬁc weights to the diﬀerent retirement paths,
as described in table 1.5. The weights on the early retirement and the
unemployment and disability routes correspond to the sum of observed
frequencies of these routes among all people of any given age up to age
sixty-ﬁve, and the public retirement system takes the residual weight.
For wage earners, we add the unemployment-insurance and disability-
insurance paths as the two systems produce very similar beneﬁt structures.
Doing so, we give an upper bound on incentives for people to retire, as we
render all of disability voluntary. Given the lack of information for the public
sector, we consider as early retirees all people retiring before the age of
sixty.
As for the self-employed, we only allow for one path in our computation
as the disability system provides quite low levels of beneﬁts with very strict
conditions. Furthermore, it would be very diﬃcult for us to compute any
reasonable amount of disability beneﬁts due to the lack of good earnings
information that we mentioned earlier.
A last important remark relates to retirement beneﬁts of two-worker
couples. It sometimes happens that the dependent beneﬁt of a spouse is
larger than the beneﬁts based on the individual’s own work history. In that
case, we apply the oﬃcial rule of supplementing the pension based on the
personal earnings history by the diﬀerence between the potential depend-
ent beneﬁts of the spouse and the pension for work. Furthermore, the SSW
measure that will be used hereafter includes both the worker’s and the
spouse’s potential SSW, independent of whether or not the individual con-
tinues to work.7
Based on this weighted SSW, we then compute diﬀerent secondary in-
centive measures. A ﬁrst one is the concept of accrual, which simply repre-
sents the variation in SSW that is obtained by retiring next year rather than
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7. We assume that the spouse retires on a standard retirement path (using the previously de-
ﬁned weights) as soon as the spouse is entitled to access any one of the three main public re-
tirement programs.the present. Table 1.6 gives the summary statistics we obtain by applying
this ﬁrst incentive measure to the entire sample of individuals belonging to
the diﬀerent social security systems.
At all ages from ﬁfty to sixty, we ﬁnd that the value of the SSW median
is always higher than $200,000. For accruals, notice the large spread be-
tween the values we obtain for people at the tenth and the ninetieth per-
centile of the distribution. Another feature that our tabulation reveals is
that once men and women attain age sixty, more than 90 percent of them
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Table 1.5 Weight of the Diﬀerent Pathways to Retirement (by age)
Wage Earners Civil Servants
Public Early Unemployment/ Public Early
Age Retirement Retirement Disability Retirement Retirement
Men
50 0.335 0.479 0.186 0.948 0.052
51 0.351 0.483 0.166 0.948 0.052
52 0.362 0.485 0.153 0.949 0.051
53 0.382 0.479 0.138 0.953 0.047
54 0.401 0.473 0.126 0.952 0.048
55 0.417 0.472 0.111 0.956 0.044
56 0.456 0.442 0.102 0.963 0.037
57 0.502 0.415 0.083 0.968 0.032
58 0.605 0.331 0.064 0.977 0.023
59 0.757 0.185 0.058 0.982 0.018
60 0.807 0.145 0.048 0.990 0.010
61 0.844 0.112 0.044 1.000 0.000
62 0.903 0.065 0.032 1.000 0.000
63 0.970 0.018 0.012 1.000 0.000
64 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
65 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Women
50 0.526 0.210 0.264 0.937 0.063
51 0.570 0.214 0.216 0.947 0.053
52 0.586 0.219 0.195 0.950 0.050
53 0.623 0.201 0.176 0.961 0.039
54 0.658 0.176 0.166 0.965 0.035
55 0.700 0.169 0.131 0.973 0.027
56 0.756 0.143 0.101 0.984 0.016
57 0.835 0.122 0.043 0.991 0.009
58 0.924 0.048 0.028 1.000 0.000
59 0.995 0.000 0.005 1.000 0.000
60 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
61 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
62 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
63 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
64 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
65 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000face negative accruals. These results are essentially due to the fact that, un-
der the rules outlined in section 1.2, workers are hardly penalized for re-
tirement at age sixty rather than sixty-ﬁve. Also, notice the eﬀect of the
early retirement systems that are made generally available to workers at key
ages, such as ﬁfty-two, ﬁfty-ﬁve, and ﬁfty-eight. For men, we observe quite
substantial negative accruals at very early ages because of the availability
of very generous early retirement provisions. For women, the situation is
slightly diﬀerent. First of all, the value of the accrual for women is much
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Table 1.6 Social Security Wealth and Accrual
Accrual
Age Obs. SSW Median 10th % Median 90th % SD
Men
50 2,821 248,352 –10,441 –5,722 4,905 8,517
51 2,586 250,816 –9,579 –4,878 5,021 8,006
52 2,305 250,300 –10,465 –5,232 4,925 7,746
53 2,150 250,413 –9,944 –5,005 5,404 7,600
54 2,076 251,578 –9,285 –1,052 6,722 8,213
55 2,045 255,997 –12,164 –4,990 5,168 8,481
56 1,894 255,076 –10,868 –4,163 4,745 7,665
57 1,701 258,560 –14,785 –3,917 4,954 8,363
58 1,409 255,560 –13,758 –4,228 5,155 7,726
59 1,151 258,025 –6,919 –658 5,864 6,050
60 1,027 259,078 –18,113 –9,673 –167 6,868
61 694 240,421 –18,405 –8,995 –187 7,083
62 473 207,874 –18,895 –8,382 –205 7,577
63 375 199,347 –18,148 –7,660 –301 7,101
64 302 199,683 –17,999 –8,051 –374 7,421
65 229 203,135 –20,918 –12,376 –6,596 6,318
Women
50 1,464 227,610 –9,380 –2,775 4,418 5,889
51 1,273 231,872 –5,528 –1,028 5,231 5,533
52 1,118 232,794 –7,348 –1,824 4,768 5,560
53 940 233,461 –6,706 –1,354 5,403 5,455
54 869 229,748 –6,223 –1,268 5,228 5,112
55 824 229,591 –7,276 –1,707 5,000 5,261
56 747 230,956 –8,408 –1,855 4,846 5,461
57 621 231,328 –9,494 –1,789 5,235 6,201
58 514 234,003 –8,755 –989 5,512 5,760
59 443 232,094 –9,027 –514 6,109 6,089
60 391 232,243 –18,179 –11,053 –6,473 5,616
61 227 217,335 –17,306 –10,448 –6,213 4,896
62 97 207,054 –17,430 –10,319 –5,928 6,694
63 78 197,000 –17,753 –9,778 –5,361 5,242
64 57 172,528 –14,555 –8,455 –4,992 4,553
65 44 143,350 –15,120 –8,899 –3,434 4,259
Note: Obs. = observations; SD = standard deviation.less negative for ages up to ﬁfty-nine than the values observed for men.
Women usually have shorter periods of aﬃliation with the social security
systems and thus have more limited access to these early retirement
schemes. Furthermore, the change in accruals is much more pronounced
at the ninetieth percentile for women than for men. We see two broad rea-
sons for this ﬁnding. First of all, for single women with a rather complete
earnings history, the same logic applies as the one we already saw for men.
For married women however, the husband’s earnings history plays an im-
portant role in the determination of the value of the wife’s accrual. To il-
lustrate this point, it is easiest to use a simple example. Consider a couple
in which the husband is still working when the wife turns sixty. Suppose,
rather plausibly, that the wife has an incomplete and low-income earnings
history. This woman will face a large negative accrual, as she knows that
when her husband retires, she will give up her own pension entitlement to
claim spousal beneﬁts based on her husband’s earnings history. Therefore,
an additional year of work implies a net loss both in terms of pension in-
come (based on her earnings record) and in terms of further social security
contributions that will in the end not aﬀect her pension entitlement.
The ﬁndings are very similar once we restrict our attention to the wage
earners’ scheme, as table 1.7 indicates. Approximately 90 percent of the
population face negative accruals starting at age ﬁfty. Under the rules of
the unemployment or early retirement systems for wage earners, ﬁctive
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Table 1.7 SSW, Accrual, and Tax or Subsidy for Male Wage Earners
SSW Accrual Tax or Subsidy
Age Obs. Median 10th % Median 90th % SD Median Pestieau-Stijns
50 1,708 269,845 –15,009 –8,064 –4,204 7,967 0.362 n.a.
51 1,552 269,298 –13,339 –7,262 –3,310 7,642 0.321 n.a.
52 1,397 267,181 –13,443 –7,665 –2,852 7,070 0.354 n.a.
53 1,318 266,273 –13,969 –7,248 –2,678 6,754 0.337 n.a.
54 1,253 265,461 –12,251 –6,182 8,467 9,206 0.279 n.a.
55 1,212 268,248 –17,706 –8,559 –3,449 7,823 0.410 0.821
56 1,083 266,265 –15,479 –8,061 –2,659 6,976 0.396 0.809
57 953 268,312 –17,663 –9,486 –1,939 7,382 0.474 0.789
58 750 265,781 –15,762 –10,026 –3,985 5,209 0.489 0.771
59 562 266,845 –8,237 –2,660 241 5,737 0.126 0.811
60 464 271,955 –17,832 –10,776 –6,018 5,402 0.498 0.496
61 336 269,417 –18,631 –11,061 –6,225 5,812 0.556 0.497
62 193 257,141 –19,053 –10,660 –4,070 6,073 0.523 0.491
63 143 247,500 –18,069 –11,256 –5,596 5,372 0.526 0.489
64 116 232,136 –18,236 –9,750 –5,057 5,738 0.499 0.473
65 95 224,505 –19,964 –12,425 –7,979 5,134 0.585 0.529
Source: Pestieau and Stijns (1999, table 1.9) and authors’ calculations.
Note: Obs. = observations; n.a. = not available.income is imputed to the earnings histories of workers on these types of
replacement income. This way, the pensions payable to a large number of
low- and medium-income workers under the wage earners’ scheme are al-
most immune to a decision to retire early.
The same ﬁnding can also be represented using a diﬀerent incentive
measure, namely the implicit tax or subsidy rate imposed by the social se-
curity system. This tax or subsidy rate is deﬁned as being the negative of the
accrual divided by the potential income during the next year.8 To allow a
comparison with the results of the previous study by Pestieau and Stijns
(1999), we restrict our attention to the subsample of male wage earners.
The simulated numbers of these authors match up pretty nicely with the
ones we derive for our sample from age sixty upward. At earlier ages, the
diﬀerence is rather substantial. This result is due to the diﬀerent weighting
of the pathways into retirement as we use a weight on the early retirement
route that is smaller than the 100 percent used by these authors.
The next two incentive measures are forward-looking measures. “Peak
value” represents the diﬀerence between SSW at its peak and SSW at pres-
ent. It thus diﬀerentiates itself from the accrual measure by the fact that it
takes into account the entire SSW process, not only the variation from the
present to the next period.9 The second forward-looking measure is the
concept of “option value” as deﬁned by Stock and Wise (1990), which is
based on a utility-maximization framework. The utility function V t under-
lying the computation of the option value process can be summarized by
the following mathematical expression:
V t(r)  ∑
r 1
s t




 s t[kBs(r)] ,
where the ﬁrst expression on the right-hand side represents the utility de-
rived from labor income Y, and the second expression represents utility
derived from retirement income Bs(r);10   is the time-preference rate for
which we assume a discount rate of 3 percent, which corresponds to a value
of   of approximately .97. The variable   corresponds to a parameter of
risk aversion and is set to   0.75. Finally, k   1.5 expresses the relative
weight of utility of retirement income as compared to wage income.
The concept of option value Gt(r∗) is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence in
utility terms between retiring at the best point in the future (r∗) and now
(t).
Gt(r∗)   V t(r∗)   V t(t)
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8. In line with the Belgian social insurance legislation, we apply a somewhat diﬀerent pro-
jection mechanism for this income ﬁgure than for the one used in the pension computation
formula that we discussed in section 1.4.
9. Peak value is equal to accrual if the peak of the SSW process is attained with immediate
retirement.
10. The value of the beneﬁt corresponds to the weighted sum of retirement income using
the weights of table 1.5.Summary statistics for both of these forward-looking measures are given
in table 1.8. The peak value numbers of table 1.8 for men and women older
than ﬁfty-nine strongly resemble those we discussed for the accrual deﬁni-
tion in table 1.6. Even at lower ages, we ﬁnd that these concepts only diﬀer
at the top of the distribution. The cause for this ﬁnding is the pressure built
into the Belgian retirement systems to retire as early as possible. The peak
of the SSW variable is often attained by retiring as soon as possible, hence
bringing the two incentive measures to equality. For a nonnegligible frac-
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Table 1.8 Peak Values and Option Values
Peak Value Option Value
Age Obs. 10th % Median 90th % SD  10th % Median 90th % SD
Men
50 2,821 –10,408 –5,677 19,975 14,717 2,256 9,917 22,959 12,014
51 2,586 –9,576 –4,749 19,790 14,299 2,192 9,291 21,681 10,801
52 2,305 –10,433 –4,911 18,842 13,869 1,903 8,186 19,915 10,498
53 2,150 –9,817 –3,186 18,515 13,388 1,701 7,065 17,602 9,539
54 2,076 –9,218 –499 17,802 12,301 1,463 6,053 15,650 8,976
55 2,045 –12,164 –4,761 15,790 12,676 975 5,117 13,535 9,318
56 1,894 –10,868 –4,017 13,694 11,331 919 4,478 12,954 9,002
57 1,701 –14,785 –3,890 12,698 11,596 674 3,722 11,466 9,048
58 1,409 –13,757 –4,204 10,144 10,066 654 3,106 10,805 7,905
59 1,151 –6,919 –646 6,054 6,357 710 2,191 9,597 7,692
60 1,027 –18,113 –9,633 –167 7,293 –812 644 8,608 8,371
61 694 –18,405 –8,995 –170 7,243 –929 656 10,096 9,755
62 473 –18,816 –8,348 –205 7,527 –913 759 13,011 8,360
63 375 –18,148 –7,660 –301 7,120 –872 847 12,927 7,528
64 302 –17,999 –8,051 –374 7,421 –912 483 8,583 5,918
65 229 –20,918 –12,376 –6,596 6,318 –1,037 –215 7,253 5,748
Women
50 1,464 –9,327 3,836 26,321 15,449 1,459 8,730 17,333 7,267
51 1,273 –5,500 4,956 25,590 14,209 1,453 8,154 16,145 6,336
52 1,118 –7,324 3,557 25,138 13,817 989 7,389 14,897 5,789
53 940 –6,641 3,720 24,703 13,216 956 6,746 13,437 5,499
54 869 –6,219 3,062 22,974 12,542 805 6,077 12,279 5,268
55 824 –7,276 2,009 20,097 11,917 500 5,430 10,739 5,507
56 747 –8,408 1,592 17,510 11,269 233 4,661 9,198 4,968
57 621 –9,494 1,175 14,502 10,349 –137 3,764 7,460 4,236
58 514 –8,755 1,132 12,123 8,716 –222 2,959 5,530 3,359
59 443 –9,027 –12 6,383 7,883 –324 1,959 4,016 3,536
60 391 –18,179 –10,890 –6,294 6,453 –1,532 284 2,120 2,886
61 227 –17,306 –10,217 –6,213 5,754 –1,466 507 1,920 4,920
62 97 –17,430 –10,315 –5,928 6,700 –1,264 1,125 2,998 5,422
63 78 –17,753 –9,753 –5,361 5,293 –1,126 761 2,851 2,762
64 57 –14,555 –8,455 –4,922 4,553 –681 1,323 4,152 3,826
65 44 –15,120 –8,899 –3,434 4,259 –728 1,561 4,167 5,418
Note: Obs. = observations; SD = standard deviation.tion of the population younger than sixty, there are quite large possible
gains from continuing to work. Hence, we ﬁnd rather large standard devi-
ations in the peak value indicator.
As for the option value statistics, it is important to recognize the major
role played by the utility term that is based on wage income during any ad-
ditional period of work. As a result, most values are positive. The same
qualitative results still hold true if we do some sensitivity analysis by re-
placing either the value of k by 1, the value of   by 1, or both.
1.6 Regression Results
The present section summarizes the regression results we obtained while
performing probit estimations with three of the above incentive mea-
sures—namely accrual, peak value, and option value. The dependent vari-
able is retirement; it equals one in the case that the individual retires within
the year of observation, and zero otherwise. As indicated in section 1.3, we
deﬁne retired persons as those who have either a pension or early retire-
ment income and have income from work smaller than the threshold, or
who have unemployment or disability income and no income from work.
All estimations include an intercept term, as well as a diﬀering series of
controls. The controls include demographic variables (marital status, a
dummy for an active spouse, a dummy variable for dependent children,
and the age diﬀerence between the individual and the partner). Further-
more, age is inserted for some speciﬁcations in the form of a dummy vari-
able for each age, and for other speciﬁcations in the form of a linear age
variable. Earnings appear in three ways: individual projected annual earn-
ings and average lifetime income (only available for wage earners); pro-
jected potential spousal annual earnings (all these variables are in dollars,
converted at the exchange rate on 31 December 1999), and lastly, system
variables are also used in all the speciﬁcations.
Furthermore, all of these models contain controls for activity sector (ten
dummies), level of schooling (eight dummies), squared earnings and life-
time earnings, an occupational pension dummy, a private retirement sav-
ings dummy, a home ownership dummy, real estate income, regions (Brus-
sels, Flanders, or Wallonia), and dummies for the year of the observation
(1993, 1994, or 1995). The estimates of them are not reported in the tables
for space reasons.11
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 summarize our regression results and are organized
as follows: We estimated a total of six probit models, separate for men and
women. The six models are the combination of our three dynamic incen-
tive measures with two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the age variable. The ﬁrst
column for every incentive measure reports the results of a probit model
60 Arnaud Dellis, Raphaël Desmet, Alain Jousten, and Sergio Perelman




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.with a linear age trend. The second column then reports the results of a
model in which we replace the linear age trend by age dummies. The moti-
vation for this change is to allow for nonlinearities in the systems that our
incentive measures do not fully capture.
Inspection of the diﬀerent columns of table 1.9 reveals that the incentive
measures are signiﬁcant when taken individually. Comparing the estimates
from the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, we see that this result is pretty robust as
these estimates do not depend on the precise functional form of the speci-
ﬁcation. The SSW has a small negative eﬀect on the probability of retire-
ment. The numbers reported in parentheses indicate the change in the
underlying probability function as a result of a small change in the incen-
tive variable. The three dynamic incentive variables, accrual (AC), peak
value (PV), and option value (OV), have a strong negative eﬀect on the
probability of retiring, as reported in parentheses below the parameter es-
timates. Also notice the positive eﬀect of the civil-servant-system dummy,
which contrasts with a generally insigniﬁcant self-employment dummy.
Table 1.10 reveals that the dynamic incentive variables (AC, PV, and OV)
also display a large degree of signiﬁcance for women and an even stronger
probability eﬀect than for men. However, our estimates seem to indicate
that the level of SSW does not have a lot of explanatory power in women’s
retirement decisions. Furthermore, the signiﬁcance of the system dummies
is very diﬀerent from the ﬁndings for men. The civil servants dummy is
never signiﬁcant at any conventional level, and the self-employment
dummy is always negative, but rarely with a high degree of signiﬁcance.
This seems to indicate that self-employed women represent a somewhat
special group that is more reluctant to retire, or alternatively, this ﬁnding
may be due to the fact that we do not fully capture all the characteristics of
the system.
As expected, age variables have a strong eﬀect on retirement probabili-
ties, either in the form of continuous or dummy variables. However, age
dummies at ages smaller than sixty seem to be much stronger for men than
for women, particularly so at the key early retirement ages (ﬁfty-two, ﬁfty-
ﬁve, and ﬁfty-eight years old). Women—given their generally incomplete
earnings histories—are often simply not eligible for some or all of the early
retirement beneﬁts. Alternatively, it may reﬂect the fact that women’s in-
comes generally represent a smaller fraction of household resources and
hence that women’s behavior is strongly inﬂuenced by the decisions that
their husbands make.
Looking at the pseudo R2 of the diﬀerent probit models, we notice that
those models that include age dummies uniformly perform better than
those simply integrating a linear age trend. However, regarding the ques-
tion of which dynamic incentive variable has the highest explanatory
power, we ﬁnd that the accrual measure performs best for both men and
women.
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(SSW, AC, PV, and OV) capture the entire impact of the numerous beneﬁt
provisions in the diﬀerent retirement income systems available in Belgium.
Particularly, and somewhat surprisingly, the replacement of the linear age
trend by a dummy-variable model does not seem to have a major impact on
the sign, the value, or the signiﬁcance of the estimates of the incentive vari-
ables SSW, AC, PV, and OV for men. The story is slightly diﬀerent for fe-
males as we can observe in table 1.10 where the probability eﬀect of the ac-
crual variables changes slightly more. We interpret these ﬁndings as rather
comforting as they tend to indicate that our SSW and dynamic incentive
variables have a rather stable explanatory power and hence, they capture
some of the nonlinearities of the retirement income systems in Belgium.
Coming back to the other results presented in tables 1.9 and 1.10, a ﬁnd-
ing common to all estimations for men and women is that the presence of
an active spouse does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the retirement prob-
ability. However, the presence of any additional dependent in the family
has a signiﬁcant negative impact on retirement decisions. Being married
also has a positive eﬀect on the probability of retirement, with a particu-
larly high level of signiﬁcance for women. A similar strongly positive eﬀect
is observable with respect to the age diﬀerence between spouses, but again
only for women.12
The eﬀect of the earnings variables is rather similar for men and women.
First of all, average life-cycle earnings (a variable only available for wage
earners) positively inﬂuence the retirement decision, but the coeﬃcients
are not statistically signiﬁcant in the case of women. On the contrary, pro-
jected earnings have, as expected, a negative and signiﬁcant inﬂuence upon
retirement when the dynamic incentive variables are AC and PV. In the OV
models, however, this eﬀect vanishes naturally, as projected earnings enter
directly in the calculation of the incentive measure. Finally, the projected
spouse earnings appear to have no impact on individual decisions for ei-
ther men or women.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 plot the observed hazard rate of departures into re-
tirement by sex and by age on the same scale as the departure probabilities
implied by age eﬀects of the age-dummy regression models. One important
result is that the dummy eﬀects follow the changes in the empirical hazards
very closely. This tends to indicate that our incentive models only explain
a fraction of the retirement process and that the dummies are a good com-
plementary tool for capturing some of the nonlinearities that our general
SSW computation cannot absorb. One plausible explanation for this ﬁnd-
ing is that many of the retirement decisions taken in the Belgian companies
and public administrations can be seen as mandatory for individuals, while
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12. As indicated in table 1.4, the average age diﬀerence between women and men within










































































































nthey can be seen as collectively voluntary, as trade unions intervene in the
negotiations relating to many early retirement schemes. Therefore, incen-
tive measures have only a very limited role to play in the decision on when
to stop working. Our ﬁndings also back the previously discussed result that
the explanatory power of the accrual model is highest for men, while op-
tion value does best for women.
1.7 Simulations
We present the results of some simulation exercises to better understand
the results we found in the preceding section. We focus our attention on two
hypothetical policy reforms. The ﬁrst one consists of an increase by three
years of all the key ages in the various retirement and early retirement sys-
tems. Even though there is no clear eligibility age for unemployment, sick-
ness, or disability insurance, we suppose that these programs become avail-
able three years later than we supposed in the original setup. The second
reform consists of a policy that would harmonize the retirement-income sys-
tems in all the countries covered in the present collection. This latter “com-
mon reform” replaces the myriad of current retirement and early retirement
systems by a uniform and unique retirement system. Early retirement would
be possible at age sixty at the earliest, while the normal retirement age would
be sixty-ﬁve. At age sixty-ﬁve, every individual would be entitled to retire-
ment income that corresponds to a replacement rate of 60 percent of the
pension with respect to the average income over the ﬁve years of income be-
tween ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-nine. For retirement prior to age sixty-ﬁve, a 6
percent actuarial reduction is applied to the amount of beneﬁt entitlement
on a lifetime basis. Similarly, late retirement (i.e., after age sixty-ﬁve) is re-
warded by a lifetime increase in beneﬁts of 6 percent per year of delay. For
this second policy simulation, we suppose that there is no unemployment,
sickness, or disability retirement pathways available to the individual.
For each of these two policy changes, we use three diﬀerent methodolo-
gies and apply those to the three model speciﬁcations (AC, PV, and OV)
that we derived in the previous section. Hence, we perform a total of eight-
een simulations both for men and for women. The ﬁrst simulation ap-
proach, S1, uses the estimates from the models with a linear age trend.
Given that our incentive measures SSW and AC, PV, and OV are all de-
rived using age-speciﬁc weights, we apply the weights of section 1.5 on age
a to the incentive measures at age a   3. Hence, expressed a little diﬀer-
ently, we suppose that the age-speciﬁc probabilities of replacement-income
receipt are shifted up by three years. This change in the weighting will also
have implications on retirement through the incentive-variable coeﬃ-
cients. Notice that this change in weighting only matters for the ﬁrst policy
change, as by deﬁnition, we impose the absence of any other pathway to re-
tirement in the second policy. In summary, S1 simply consists of a recom-
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tirement rates by the application of the new SSW and AC values to our es-
timated coeﬃcients.
The second simulation approach, S2, is the same as the ﬁrst, except that
it uses the model with age dummies included. The impact of this change in
the modeling of age does not have a major impact on the coeﬃcients of the
incentive variables. However, the age-dummy eﬀects are far from linear, and
hence it is possible that these dummies better pick up the nonlinearities in
the various retirement and early retirement systems, or alternatively that
tastes for leisure are not a linear function of age. Also, as we already men-
tioned in a preceding section, it is possible that a nonnegligible fraction of
retirees are facing compulsory retirement at a given age. However, a com-
forting ﬁnding is that the incentive eﬀects seem to be pretty robust to the
change in the modeling of age. This seems to indicate that the dummies do
not simply take away explanatory power from the incentive variables, but
rather contribute new information of their own to the analysis of the vari-
ance. This second simulation approach implicitly privileges the explanation
of diﬀerent leisure tastes over the explanation that the SSW and the related
incentive variables do not fully capture the nonlinearities in the system.
A third and last simulation approach is labeled “S3.” For policy 1, it uses
the model with age dummies, but on top of incrementing the incentive and
SSW measures and the eligibility probabilities, it also increments the age
dummies by three years. We do not only recompute the values of our SSW
measures arising from the change, but we also recompute the value of the
age dummies themselves, so that the age-ﬁfty-three dummy takes on the es-
timated value of the age-ﬁfty dummy, the age-sixty-eight dummy takes on
the estimated value of the age-sixty-ﬁve dummy, and so forth. This ap-
proach takes a view rather opposed to S2 as it implicitly imputes the entire
eﬀect on the age dummies to the social security incentives. Clearly, the
truth will be between these two extremes.
For policy 2 and S3, we proceed in a similar way, but the impact of age
dummies are modiﬁed in a diﬀerent way. On the one hand, given that in this
policy simulation alternative retirement pathways are assumed out, we
apply the age-ﬁfty-one dummy for both men and women to all ages up to
age ﬁfty-nine, just prior to the early retirement age.13 On the other hand,
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13. The method applied diﬀers from the one used in the other articles of the volume. In
those papers, the eﬀects of age dummies before age sixty are imputed following the trend of
estimated dummies from age ﬁfty to ﬁfty-four (the age at which the path ﬁrst breaks in the
dummies) whenever this trend is positive. However, this would lead us to unrealistic results.
The observed age trend in dummies between the ages of ﬁfty and ﬁfty-four—and hence the
extrapolation thereof till the age of ﬁfty-nine—would be highly progressive and extremely
powerful, it would occur in a situation in which we have assumed away all early retirement
schemes. The reason for this extreme ﬁnding is that even people in the lowest age bracket con-
sidered face high exit rates from the labor force because of the characteristics of the Belgian
retirement income landscape.we keep the eﬀect of age-sixty and -sixty-ﬁve dummies unchanged, assum-
ing that policy 2 will not aﬀect individual behavior at these particular ages.
Finally, using these two dummy values, we imputed the values of the inter-
mediary dummies, from age sixty-one to age sixty-four assuming a smooth
path trend.
We present the results of these simulations in three broad ways. First of
all table 1.11 summarizes the eﬀect on the average retirement age of the
three models (AC, PV, and OV) and the three simulations (S1, S2, and S3)
for the two policy changes discussed (policy 1 and policy 2). In an attempt
not to overcrowd the paper with tables and ﬁgures, only the results corre-
sponding to the accrual model for women are reported.14 Second, ﬁgures
1.3 to 1.14, panels A, illustrate the hazard rates of departure into retirement
under the diﬀerent speciﬁcations as compared to the baseline observed haz-
ard using the underlying speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst nine of these graphs sum-
marize the results of the nine simulations for men. The last three ﬁgures (ﬁg-
ures 1.12, 1.13, and 1.14) are the results of the simulations done for women
using the accrual model. Third, ﬁgures 1.3 to 1.14, panels B, present the cu-
mulative distribution function (CDF) of departures into retirement.
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Table 1.11 Average Retirement Age
Simulated Reform
Model Simulation Policy 1 Policy 2
Men
Base retirement rate 58.38 58.38
AC S1 59.49 59.22
S2 58.78 59.08
S3 61.18 59.11
PV S1 59.72 59.15
S2 59.01 59.05
S3 61.34 59.05




Base retirement rate 57.43 57.43
AC S1 58.59 57.33
S2 58.18 57.36
S3 59.99 57.51






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)Our ﬁndings tend to indicate that the proposed reforms would have a
rather signiﬁcant impact on the retirement behavior of older Belgians, es-
pecially for policy 1. This is not really surprising since the hypothetical
changes represent massive shake-ups of the system. Indeed, in a country
such as Belgium where the current average observed departure out of the
labor force lies well below the early retirement age of the oﬃcial pension
system (sixty for most individuals aside from teachers and similarly privi-
leged occupations), the elimination of all these early exit routes from the la-
bor force has to be seen as an earthquake. This is particularly true if we con-
sider simulations of the S3 type. No matter which incentive variable we use
(AC, PV, or OV), we see strong eﬀects on the hazard rate of departures and,
as a consequence, strong eﬀects on the cumulative distribution function.
The ﬁgures clearly display the wide disparity between the hazard func-
tions and the cumulative distribution functions depending on which simu-
lation method (S1, S2, or S3) serves as a basis for the simulation. There is,
however, a large degree of similarity between the results we obtain using
one of the three simulation methods while changing between any of the
three diﬀerent incentive variables (AC, PV, or OV). Summary measures
such as the average retirement age, although useful in their own way, are
clearly insuﬃcient for understanding the total change in the retirement
patterns. Very similar average retirement ages can be derived from very
diﬀerent hazard processes.
The ﬁndings also comfort the intuitive idea that the changes in the haz-
ard rate implied by policy 1 should be clearest in S1 and S3, where the
jumps at ages sixty are simply shifted up by three years. Of the three meth-
ods, S1 is the most conservative in terms of the changes in the hazard rate,
which should also not surprise the reader because of the underlying linear
age trend that is involved. Not surprisingly, the eﬀect of policies 1 and 2 are
the most divergent in S3, where their speciﬁcities fully come to bear on the
hazard rates. This clearly illustrates the importance of the question of
whether we should (S3) or should not (S2) also change the weights on the
age dummies in the dummy model.
1.8 Conclusions
The rapid aging of the Belgian population creates major problems for
the ﬁnancing of the public retirement and early retirement systems. This is
even more so, given the rather impressive decline of labor force participa-
tion that we have witnessed in Belgium over the last several decades, which
has made the country one of the world leaders in putting its people into re-
tirement at very early ages. Because of the varying departure patterns from
the labor force in the diﬀerent systems, these challenges will also have a
very diﬀerent impact on their viability.
96 Arnaud Dellis, Raphaël Desmet, Alain Jousten, and Sergio PerelmanThe present paper sets a new standard in analyzing the retirement deci-
sions of Belgian workers because it models and analyzes the impact of in-
centive variables, such as the present-discounted value of social security
entitlements and the change that occurs in the latter when people change
their age of retirement. Our paper ﬁnds strong evidence that social security
accruals are strongly negative for most people aged sixty and above. More
strikingly, more than 50 percent of workers face negative accruals as early
as age ﬁfty-eight. We ﬁnd a similar picture using more forward-looking in-
centive measures that take into account the entire future path of beneﬁt dy-
namics. Even more importantly, we ﬁnd a strong and very signiﬁcant neg-
ative impact of these dynamic incentive variables, such as AC and OV, on
the decision to work. Hence, we ﬁnd that workers with smaller rewards or
even penalties on continued work do indeed retire earlier from the labor
force.
These ﬁndings are of a crucial importance in the light of reforms to one,
several, or all of the Belgian retirement systems. Governments and policy-
makers cannot simply assume that retirement decisions are static, but
rather have to take into account the impact of the SSW and the dynamic
incentive measures. We illustrate this logic by applying two rather distinct
hypothetical policy proposals for reforming the Belgian retirement land-
scape, which have in common a reduction of beneﬁt entitlements to im-
prove the chances of survival of the public retirement-income systems. Our
simulations show that such reforms have the potential to induce major
changes in observed retirement patterns.
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